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Abstract
This paper compares the behavior of real interest rate differentials across the major countries under
the Bretton Woods regime and the regime of floating exchanges that replaced it.  The primary object is to
investigate both the extent of market integration and  its changes over time. For all fifteen possible country
pairs real interest differentials are mean reverting, and in two-thirds of these cases indistinguishable from
zero statistically.  For all country pairs on average and for most such pairs individually, moreover, the
estimated differentials are not appreciably different in absolute value than the differentials that we estimate
for various money-market rates within the United States. Additional evidence points to a narrowing of
differentials under floating rates over time and an increase in speeds of convergence.1
“The rate of interest plays a central role in two great branches of economic science, – the theory
of prices, and the theory of distribution.  The role of the rate of interest in the theory of prices
applies to the determination of the prices of wealth, property, and services.”
Irving Fisher (1907, p. 225).
In an integrated world economy, real rates of interest on physical assets will tend to converge.  So
too will real rates of interest on financial assets like bonds, which are much more directly observable. 
Real interest rate equalization is, therefore, the broadest, and arguably most theoretically appealing, of the
various measures of financial integration.
 In this paper, we examine the behavior of cross-country real interest rate differentials for the
United States and five other major industrial countries vis-à-vis one another during the last decade and a
half of the Bretton Woods period and under the current regime of floating rates that replaced it.  We
investigate both the extent of financial market integration per se and whether and how it may have changed
through time.
We focus on three issues specifically: whether real interest rate differentials, if not literally zero,
are at least small in absolute value and hence consistent with financial integration in the presence of cross-
country differences in risk; whether they are mean reverting, and hence indicative of long-run equilibrium;
and whether and how their behavior has differed across exchange-rate regimes.  As a first step in this
investigation, we examine separately the time-series behavior of the individual countries' real interest rates
and their nominal rate and inflation components.
We find after allowing for a structural break in 1980 that real interest rates in the six countries are
stationary.  We find further that cross-country differentials are invariant to the change in regime.
Fluctuations in differentials occur periodically over the sample period, but while somewhat persistent, in
the end prove transitory.  For all fifteen possible country pairs real-interest- rate differentials are mean2
reverting, and in two-thirds of these cases indistinguishable from zero statistically.  Additional evidence
points to a narrowing of these cross-country differentials through time and an increase in speeds of
convergence.
Has international financial integration, therefore, increased?  Some of this evidence suggests that
it has; almost none suggests the opposite.  Viewed from an absolute standpoint, moreover, the degree of
integration appears to be not drastically different from what one finds comparing the behaviors of spreads
between the nominal rates yielded by different domestic financial instruments.  If the markets for these
instruments can be considered well integrated, as they commonly are believed to be, then the implication
is obvious -- so also international markets.
1.  Theory and Previous Evidence
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where the Ds are the real rates of interest, the Rs are  nominal interest rates and the B
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anticipated at time t to prevail over the life of the bond.
1
The economic rationale for real interest equalization, also follows directly from Fisher’s analysis
(see in particular, Fisher, 1907, pp. 279-280).  The real rate of interest in Fisher’s framework is the real
rate of return on physical assets -- in his terminology the “commodity rate of interest.”  It and the real rate
of interest on financial assets are linked via an arbitrage relationship.  Using this framework, we can view
the cross-country differential in real interest rates on bonds as made up of two components, the cross-
country differential in  real interest rates on physical assets and the (two) within-country differentials3
between real interest rates on physical assets and on bonds:
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where a  D 6t and D 6
F
t are the real interest rates on physical assets in the two countries.  The first term on the
right-hand side reflects the degree of arbitrage across countries; the second, the degree of financial
intermediation within the two countries.  Viewed from this perspective, the equalization of real interest
rates on financial assets therefore depends not only on arbitrage among countries but between markets for
financial assets and goods within countries.
2
In the empirical work that follows, we use ex post measures of real interest rates throughout. 
Since under rational expectations these errors will be mean zero in large samples, we place more
confidence in inferences with regard to the long-run behavior of real interest differentials than their short-
run movements.
An additional reason for emphasizing the long run is the possible effect of shocks on interest differentials.
Although the evidence on this question has been mixed, a considerable number of recent studies suggest
that monetary shocks have significant effects on real interest rates over the shorter run.
3  Given differences
in the magnitudes and timing of such shocks among countries, these effects are likely to spill over into real
interest differentials as well as the levels of rates within the various countries.  Thus, for example, a
monetary tightening in the United States that goes unmatched by similar policy changes abroad would lead
to short-term increases in U.S. real interest rates and increases in U.S. versus foreign real interest
differentials.   Real shocks -- waves of innovation, productivity shocks, fiscal policy changes and the like --
also might be expected to have short-term real-rate effects that differ across countries. 
Much of the earlier empirical evidence has appeared to be  inconsistent with complete financial
integration and full equality of real interest rates among countries.
4   In direct tests of real-interest rate4
equality, based on regressions such as
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researchers generally have rejected the hypothesis that (a b) =  (0 1). These studies, most of which are now
well over a decade old, include Cumby and Mishkin (1986), Mark (1985), Merrick and Saunders (1986)
and,  more recently, Marston (1995).
Indirect evidence derived from studies of purchasing power parity and covered and uncovered
interest parity, has told a similar story.  To understand the relevance of such  evidence to the issue of real
interest rate equality, consider the following alternative  decomposition of the real interest differential:
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where fdt is the forward premium, ds
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t is the anticipated change in the log nominal exchange rate, and  
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F)] the deviation from anticipated purchasing power parity (in rate-of-
change form).  The sum of the first two right-hand-side terms, in turn, is the deviation from uncovered
interest rate parity.
With well-functioning and otherwise efficient money and foreign-exchange markets , arbitrage will
insure that covered  interest parity holds exactly.  In the presence of capital controls or other similar
governmental interferences in these markets this will not be the case, which is why Frankel and MacArthur
(1988) refer to the deviation from covered  interest parity as the “political premium.”   For the 1982-87
sample period that they use these premia are small and statistically insignificant for the major industrial
countries.   France is the one exception.
5
Since other studies generally report similar findings,  researchers have focused greater attention5
on the second and third right-hand-side terms in equation (4),  particularly the second.
6   Here the results
have been largely negative.  Using quarterly and monthly data and forecast horizons of one to twelve
months, researchers generally have found significant differentials between fd and $ s
*.
7  They have
interpreted these differentials variously as risk premia, reflections of rational learning in the presence of
regime changes, and irrational behavior on the part of traders.
8  Whatever the underlying cause, these
differentials taken by themselves  imply non-zero differentials between real interest rates internationally.
9
 Of particular concern has been the effect of exchange-rate variability on real-interest differentials.
The uncertainty generated by frequent and substantial changes in real exchange rates, some observers have
argued, has adversely affected the functioning of capital markets.  Although international arbitrage
continues to take place, it is hampered by the heightened uncertainty.  The flow of capital from one country
to another according to this argument is decreased which, in turn, results in widened cross-country real
interest differentials (see, e.g., McKinnon, 1990) 
10.
Lothian (2000), examining annual data on real interest rate differentials over the long period 1791-
1992, however, has failed to find such effects.  His evidence shows largely similar (but non-zero) cross-
country real interest differentials under the classical gold standard of 1875-1914, the Bretton Woods regime
and the current float.  Several other recent studies of real interest equalization for the floating rate period
alone also present results somewhat more favorable to the real interest equalization.  These include
Goodwin and Grennes (1994), Gagnon and Unreth (1995), Johnson (1992), Kugler and Neusser (1993) and
Mancuso, Goodwin and Grennes (2001).  All find at least a long-run tendency toward stable real interest
differentials, if not outright real-interest equality.  Kang and Fratianni (1993) in a study of major-country
equity markets also present evidence of increased integration during the course of the 1980s.
2.  Empirical Results
The interest-rate data used in the empirical analysis are quarterly short-term domestic money-6
market interest rates for six countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) over the period 1957 Q1 to 2000 Q2.  We chose these countries because of their prominent
positions in the world economy and because of the availability of relatively long data series for thse
countries.  Unfortunately data for treasury bill rates are only available for the full period for Canada, the
United Kingdom and the United States.  For France, Germany and Japan we therefore used call money
rates.  The price-level data used in constructing real interest rates were for consumer price indexes or other
similar cost-of-living indexes.  The source for all of these data was the CD-ROM version of the
International Monetary Fund' s  International Financial Statistics.
2.A.  Overview of the Data
Figures 1 and 2 provide a summary view of how real interest rates in the six countries have
behaved over the sample period.  Shown in Figure 1 is a time-series plot of the quarterly six-country
average real rate, and plus and minus one standard deviation upper and lower bounds about that average.
Shown in Figure 2 is a separate plot of the quarterly cross-country standard deviations used to derive the
bounds in Figure 1.
Two features of Figure 1 stand out.  The first is the importance of two jump-like movements in the
three series, the abrupt decline that occurs around 1973 and the even more dramatic increase that begin
in or around early 1980.  The second is the fact that these movements appear to take place in most of the
countries.  Though a small bit of evidence, this commonalty of movements is certainly consistent with the
view that these countries are part of an integrated world market.
< Figures 1 and 2 go about here>   
Also evident in this chart, but perhaps better illustrated by Figure 2, are the often substantial
quarterly, cross-country divergences in real interest rates that occur in particular quarters.  But as Figure
2 also demonstrates, persistently wide real-interest differentials are not a general phenomenon.  Instead they7
appear to be confined to several clearly defined periods.  In the end, differentials on average narrow and
appear to return to a stable value.  This appears to be true moreover throughout the sample period, under
both fixed and floating exchange rates.  Below we examine further these features of the data.
2.B. Results of Unit Root Tests
To investigate the time-series behavior of real interest rates and their nominal rate and inflation
components further, we first conducted a series of standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron unit root tests on the levels and first differences of the three series to try to determine the
order of integration of the series.  We  present these results in Tables 1 and 2.   Perhaps not surprisingly,
given the pattern of movements of real interest rates visible in Figure 1, the results of these tests were
somewhat ambiguous.  This could be due either to low test power or to the possible effects of structural
breaks.  Accordingly, after briefly discussing these initial test results, we go on to employ a superior
technique that endogenously allows for such breaks.
In both the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests we were unable to reject the hypothesis that the levels
of nominal interest rates contained unit roots in all but one instance.  The one exception was Japanese
nominal interest rates in the ADF tests (though not the Phillips-Perron tests).  At the same time we always
were able to reject the unit root null for the differences of the nominal rates.  We conclude that nominal
rates can be treated as I(1).  For inflation, in contrast, the two sets of tests yielded totally conflicting
results.  In the ADF tests for the levels of inflation, we never could reject the unit root hypothesis, while
in the Phillips-Perron tests we always could.  Viewed separately, the first set of results suggests that
inflation rates are I(1); the second that they are I(0).
< Tables 1 and 2 go about here>
This disparity between the two sets of test results raises obvious questions about the processes
followed by real interest rates.  If inflation and nominal interest rates are indeed both I(1), as suggested by8
the ADF tests, real interest rates could still be stationary, provided that nominal rates and inflation are
cointegrated.  If the orders of integration of the two series differ, however, as the Phillips-Perron tests
suggest they do, then real interest rates in these countries necessarily would be non-stationary as Rose
(1988) had earlier argued for the United States.  Tests performed on the real interest rates themselves failed
to resolve this issue.  In the ADF tests, we could not reject the unit root hypothesis in any instance for the
levels of real interest rates, while in the Phillips-Perron tests we always could. 
2.C. Testing for Structural Breaks
If real interest rates are in fact non-stationary it is still possible that cross-country differentials are
stationary since real rates in the various countries might very well be cointegrated.    Alternatively the
results of the unit root tests may themselves be spurious.  Unit root tests are of notoriously low power in
small samples.  In the presence of structural breaks, this is a fortiori true, as Perron (1989, 1990) has
shown, and for real interest rates this is liable to be a particularly troubling problem.  In her examination
of U.S. real interest rate data, Bonser-Neal (1990) reports such breaks occurring in both 1973 and 1980.
Garcia and Perron (1996) present later evidence consistent with those findings. For the series studied here,
the same thing appears to be true as a glance at Figure 1 indicates.
To investigate this issue econometrically, we use Zivot and Andrews' (1992) modification of
Perron' s procedure.  Zivot and Andrews argue that potential breakpoints, should be treated as endogenous.
Failure to do so will bias the unit root tests toward rejecting the unit root null too frequently.  They
therefore developed a data dependent algorithm to determine possible break points and thus transformed
Perron' s conditional unit root test into an unconditional test.  Monte Carlo simulations of their
modifications of Perron's models showed that the appropriate critical values were larger (in an absolute
sense) than those used by Perron.
They investigated three models: a shift in the mean of the process (Model A), a shift in the rate of9
growth of the process (Model B), and a shift in both the mean and the rate of growth of the process (Model
C).  The null hypothesis for all three models was:
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that is, that the series {yt} is integrated of order 1 without an exogenous structural break.  Their alternative
hypothesis is that it can be represented by various trend-stationary processes with a once only breakpoint
occurring at an unknown time in each.  The aim of the Zivot and Andrews procedure is to sequentially test
the candidates for this breakpoint and select the one that gives the most weight to the trend-stationary
alternative.  That is, the breakpoint 8 is chosen as the minimum t-value for the hypothesis "
i = 1  for i =
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where DUt(8) =  1 if t> T8 and 0 otherwise; DT
*
t(8) =  t-T8 if t> T8 and 0 otherwise and where 8 = Tb/T,
the proportion of the total number of observations T up until the breakpoint Tb.
In testing the unit root hypothesis, the smallest t-values for the hypothesis "
i =  1 in each instance
are compared with the set of critical values estimated by Zivot and Andrews.  Because their testing10
methodology is not conditional on the prior selection of the breakpoint (all points are considered potential
candidates) their critical values are larger (in an absolute sense) than those of Perron. Consequently it is
more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.
11
Table 3 presents the results of the Zivot and Andrews tests for models A, B and C.  Model A
appears to produce fairly consistent results across all countries in that it points to a structural break at
roughly the first quarter of 1980 and results in rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root in all instances.
These results therefore suggest that the implication of the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests of non-stationarity
of the various countries' real interest rates is incorrect.  We therefore proceeded on the basis that real
interest rates were stationary across all countries and examined possible dynamics of the real rate
differentials incorporating the structural break in 1980 Q1.
12    Below we consider an alternative breakpoint
of 1973 Q1 when we examine the possible effect of the change in the exchange-rate regime.
13    
< Table 3 goes about here>
The economic interpretation of the 1980 break remains unsettled.  The high U.S. budget deficits
of the early 1980s, and the adoption of new Federal Reserve operating procedures that began in  and
continued over the course of the next three years have both been cited. A variant of the latter hypothesis
focuses on the learning process in which financial market participants were forced to engage during this
period (see Evans and Wachtel, 1993; and Evans and Lewis, 1995a) as a result of the shift to a lower
inflation regime.  Ex post real interest rates were persistently high, according to this argument, because
market participants only gradually learned that a new lower inflation regime was in place.  The anticipated
rate of inflation, therefore, lagged the actual.
2.D Results for Real Rate Differentials
Although real interest rates may not be equal across countries at all points in time, they
nevertheless may revert to common long-term means.  One would expect this to be true for closely linked11
countries in particular, for example Canada and the United States with their strong economic and financial
ties and France and Germany under the ERM.
To address this issue we estimated the following equation for all possible country-pairs:
  
 
)rdijt = " 1  + " 2  D80 +  <1 rdijt-1 +  < 2  D80 rdijt-1 + e t , (7) 
 
   
where rdijt is the difference between the real interest rates in countries i and j, and D80 is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 after 1980 Q1 and is 0 otherwise.
The ratio ("1/-<1) is an estimator of the long-run differential between the two countries’ real interest
rates pre-1980 Q1.  The ratio ("1 + " 2  )/-(<1 +  < 2  ) is a similar estimator for the period thereafter.   A
value of "1 that is significantly different from zero therefore implies a significant long-run differential in
the first period.  Correspondingly, a value of "2 that is significantly different from zero implies a significant
difference between the long-run differentials in the two periods.
Table 4 presents a summary of the results based on equation (8).
14  Shown in the left part of the
table are estimates of the regression coefficients and other summary statistics; shown in the right are the
resultant estimates of the long-run average mean real interest differentials in the two periods and the related
speeds of adjustment.  The first point to note is that in only six  of the fifteen cases is "1 significantly
different from zero.  Four of these cases, moreover, involve comparisons of t-bill rates and rates on other
money market instruments, and hence may be simply a reflection of the greater risk attached to the latter.
Interestingly in four of the five comparisons of U.S. and foreign-country rates "1 is insignificant.  Nor does
the picture change very much after 1980.  In seven of the comparisons, "2 is significant, but in four of these
cases it implies a smaller average real rate differential post-1980, and in one only a negligible between-
period difference in average differentials.
< Table 4 goes about here>12
Of further interest are the patterns of adjustment implied by the estimates of <1 and <2.   In Table
4, <1  is always significantly different from zero, thus implying mean reversion for all of the country pairs.
Most of the estimated adjustment coefficients fall between roughly .50 and .70, which translates into half
lives of roughly  two to three quarters.  We find evidence of a between-period change in adjustment speeds
in the form of <2 coefficients significantly different from zero in eight cases.  In seven of these, the
estimated speed of adjustment increases, and in each instance noticeably so -- with <1  and <2 summing to
close to minus one, which in turn  implies nearly complete adjustment within the quarter.
Combined, these results suggest that there are long-run values, in a number of instances subject
to shift, toward which real rate differentials tend.  They suggest further that the differentials in the main
have narrowed  through time and that adjustment speeds have become more rapid.  A question considered
below is whether the observed long-run differentials might reasonably be due to differences in the risk
characteristics of the particular countries'  bonds. 
2.E. Behavior across Exchange-rate Regimes
As noted earlier, a major concern has been the possibly adverse effects of floating exchange rates
on international financial integration.  To investigate this issue we ran a series of regressions similar to
those reported in Table 4, but in this instance used a dummy variable for the floating-rate period to allow
intercepts and slopes to vary across regimes:  
  
 
)rdijt = " 1  + " 2  D73 +  <1 rdijt-1 +  < 2  D73 rdijt-1 + e t , (8) 
 
   
where the dummy D73 here took the value 1 beginning in 1973 Q1 and is 0 otherwise.
These results are reported in Table 5.  If the float did cause real interest differentials to widen, as
has been alleged, we would expect to see coefficients for "2 that are significantly different from zero and13
that imply larger mean differentials post-1973 Q1.  This is the case in only one instance and then just
barely.  We find "2 significantly different from zero in eight of the fifteen comparisons, but in six of  these
cases the estimated values are such that a much narrower long-run differential is implied; in the other two
the difference is almost imperceptible – less than 10 basis points in both instances, larger in one, as already
mentioned, but smaller in the other.  If we ignore statistical significance and simply compare the
magnitudes of the long-term average differentials, the picture is qualitatively the same.  Nine of fifteen
comparisons point to narrower average differentials; only six to wider.  The float per se does not appear
to have mattered in the way that has been claimed.
< Table 5 goes about here>
The final point to mention, is the inter-country pattern in the differences pre- and post-1973.  Two
countries, France and Japan, generally exhibit substantially narrower differentials under the float, Japanese
real interest rates falling relative to those of other countries and French real interest rates rising.  Canada
and the U.K. in several instances show somewhat widened differentials, both countries' real rates rising
relative to those of the other four countries in our sample.  Without stretching the point, one could interpret
the French and Japanese findings as caused by the substantial financial liberalization that took place in both
countries in the latter portion of the sample period.  The U.K. results quite possibly can be attributed to
the prolonged tight monetary policy that it pursued in the early 1990s to curb its higher than major-country
average rate of inflation.  Canada for its part did the same in the late 1980s in response to its depreciating
U.S. dollar exchange rate.
2.F. Cross-Country vs. Within-Country Rate Interest Rate Differentials
The results we have reported do not say anything about the degree of integration in an absolute
sense.  To do that we need some standard of comparison.  One possible benchmark is the behavior of
interest-rate spreads within a particular country's financial market, since such markets can reasonably be14
expected to be well integrated.  Behavior of cross-country interest differentials that closely mimicked the
behavior of within-country interest differentials would thus provide evidence of international integration.
We have made several such comparisons using the U.S. money market as our  benchmark.  The
first, which is reported in the top two lines of Table 6, uses the differential between nominal three-month
Eurodollar and 91-day Treasury bill rates; the second, which is reported in the next two lines of that table,
uses the differential between nominal 90-day prime commercial paper and 91-day treasury bill rates.
15
These regressions took the form: 
  
 
)rdijt = " 1  + < 1  rdijt-1 + e t  , (9)
 
   
where the subscripts i and j now refer to different instruments rather than to countries.
Two features of the regressions deserve comment.  The first is the estimates of the long-run
average spreads that come out of these regressions.  For the Eurodollar versus the t-bill, this is 1.20 (i.e.
"1 /- <1); for commercial paper it is .73.  Both differentials are interpretable as risk premia, with the
difference between the two most likely a reflection of the somewhat greater risk associated with bank
liabilities.  The second feature of interest is the adjustment process.  Both spreads are mean-reverting with
estimated half lives of adjustment of roughly two to three quarters (i.e. coefficients of -.21 and -.33 on the
lagged levels of the respective differentials).  For the regressions reported in Table 4 the mean absolute
values of the long-run average spreads in the two periods are 1.1 and 1.0, respectively, and hence not at
all out of line with the these two U.S. money-market spreads.  Estimated  speeds of adjustment actually
appear faster across countries.  The latter could, however, be attributable to measurement error in the
inflation-rate adjustments used in the international comparisons.  Judged by these criteria international
markets therefore appear rather well integrated.
< Table 6 goes about here>15
3. Conclusions
The evidence presented above points to considerable long-run financial integration across the six
major industrial countries examined in this study.   This is true both for the later years of Bretton Woods
and to an even greater extent for the current float.  The volatility of nominal exchange rates that has
characterized the floating-rate regime, therefore, appears not to have mattered.  After we allow for a
structural break, real interest rate differentials between pairs of countries appear mean reverting, and in
two-thirds of the cases, not significantly different from zero.  The evidence also indicates that the speed
of convergence has increased over time, and that the degree of integration between international markets
does not appear much different from that found for money-market interest rates in the U. S.
One of the major reasons that such volatility has not mattered, we believe, is the important set of
changes in the institutions surrounding international trade and finance that took place over our sample
period.  These changes were not simply fortuitous.  They came, in large part, as a response to the
markedly higher volatility of exchange rates and other economic and financial variables that began at the
end of the 1960s and that continued for well over a  decade thereafter.   As theory suggests and the
testimony of important financial market participants bears witness, regulatory and other government
constraints on markets broke down and new instruments and markets developed as the welfare costs of
these regulations and the opportunity costs of not having such markets mounted.  Thus capital controls were
removed, interest-rate ceilings on deposits circumvented, new financial instruments introduced and new
markets started.  The end result was to make it possible for market participants to cope with the increased
exchange-rate and interest-rate risk that the higher volatility engendered, and hence to offset their
potentially deleterious effects.
16
Over short but still lengthy periods, however, real interest differentials have fluctuated greatly and
at times been exceedingly wide.  Our findings suggest that this behavior has been due to two sets of factors.
 The first is the existence of capital controls and other such governmentally imposed impediments to capital16
flows.  France and Japan are examples here.  The other is as a transient response to shocks, policy and
otherwise, and not as has been previously thought, indicative of deficient market integration.  An important
question that remains to be answered concerns the specific types of shocks that have caused the movements.
A second set of issues that needs to be explored further has to do with the shifts in real interest
rates uncovered at various points in these countries in the 1970s and 1980s.  We have treated them as
nuisance parameters using dummy variables to control for these shifts.  Future work might usefully focus
on investigating the nature of these movements, their cause or causes, and whether they are once and for
all shifts or have been subsequently reversed.17
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1.  For this equation to hold, rates of inflation and the rate of change of the exchange rate have to be
defined in terms of logarithmic derivatives.  For discrete data it will only hold as a first approximation. 
2.  Friedman and Schwartz (1982, pp. 513-517) use a framework of this sort in their analysis of the UK
and US and relate the  nominal interest rate differential on bonds to the two factors identified in equation
(2)  and to the differential in the two countries’ inflation rates.
3.  See Lastrapes (1998) for multi-country evidence on this subject and the studies cited therein.
4.  See the reviews of this literature in Mussa and Goldstein (1993) and von Furstenburg (1998).
5.  Such premia, however, may have  mattered more greatly pre-1982 since capital controls were more
prevalent in this earlier period.  The removal of controls is, therefore, one reason to expect  international
capital mobility to have increased over the much longer (1957-2000) sample period that we use.
6.    In the early years of the current float PPP also seemed to be contradicted by the evidence.  Most of
the studies reaching that conclusion, however, were based on analysis of floating exchange rates in the
decade or so following their introduction.  More recent studies using long historical time series (e.g.
Lothian and Taylor, 1996) almost universally show exchange rates to be mean reverting.  More recent
studies for the float alone also suggest the same thing (e.g. Lothian, 1997).
7.  Frankel (1992, p. 200) in reviewing the evidence describes these currency premia as "substantial and
variable" and "responsible for approximately the entirety of [the] real interest differentials vis-à-vis the
United States."  In addition, see Engel (1996) and Hodrick (1987) for overviews of this literature.
8.  The risk premium explanation has been most prevalent.  Frankel and Froot (1987) present evidence of
irrationality on the part of traders.  Evans and Lewis (1995b), however, show that this latter explanation
and rational learning in the face of change in the inflation regime are observationally equivalent.  Lothian
and Simaan (1998) show that despite the often substantial departures from UIP over the shorter run, the
relation holds quite well over longer periods. 
Notes19
9.  Additional evidence on financial integration is provided by three related areas of research: the analysis
of the cross-country relations between investment and savings begun by Feldstein and Horioka (1980); the
analysis of international consumption risk sharing (e.g. Lewis, 1999); and the study of international
portfolio allocation -- the home-bias literature (e.g. Tesar and Werner, 1995).  All in one way or another
also have produced evidence of incomplete international financial links.
10   For a further discussion of this hypothesis see Mussa and Goldstein (1993).
11. We should note that the Zivot and Andrews procedure did not aim at testing for structural change per
se, but rather was designed to test for a unit root in the presence of an unknown structural break.
12. Further evidence supporting the stationarity of real interest rates is reported by Neusser (1991), and
Jackson and Lothian (1993).
13. In an earlier version of this  paper we also ran regressions using both breakpoints. These results were
not substantially different from those we report here for the 1980 breakpoint alone.
14. For the comparisons of foreign rates with U.S. rates we also estimated the equation using SUR to
correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity between countries.  These estimates were only slightly
different from the pair-wise estimates of Table 4 for the U.S.  Hence we do not report these results. 
15. The sample periods were 1957 Q1 to 2000 Q1 for CP vs. t-bill and 1972 Q1 to 2000 Q1 for Eurodollar
vs. t-bill.  All rates were expressed on a 360-day money market yield basis.
16.  See Telser (1981) for a theoretical treatment of such institutional change.  The example he considers
is future markets.   Walter Wriston, the former chairman of Citibank and an architect of the financial
changes of the late 1970s and early 1980s, provides a practitioners perspective on these developments.  In
connection with the Euro markets he writes (1986, p.133):  “No one designed them, no one authorized
them, and no one controlled them.  They were fathered by controls, raised by technology, and today are
refugees, if you will, from national attempts to allocate credit and capital, for reasons that have little to do
with finance or economics.” See Lothian (2000) for a more in-depth discussion of these issues.20
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Table 1
Unit Root Tests on Levels of Nominal Interest Rates,
 Inflation and Real Interest Rates 
Country Variable ADF Lag PP
 Canada nominal -2.03  7 -2.33
inflation -2.02  9 -4.22*
real -2.36  8 -5.83*
 France nominal -2.48  5 -2.49
inflation -1.84  5 -5.26*
real -2.86  5 -7.65*
 Germany nominal -2.70  9 -2.77
inflation -2.76 12 -8.14*
real -2.62 12 -8.99*
 Japan nominal -3.99*  5 -3.26
inflation -2.18 12 -7.34*
real -2.16 12 -7.99*
 U.K. nominal -1.82  9 -2.44
inflation -1.74 12 -6.21*
real -1.91 12 -8.22*
 U.S. nominal -1-85  7 -2.17
inflation -2.19  3 -3.66*
real -2.45  2 -4.88*
Note: Critical value of the ADF and Phillips-Perron test at 5% level is 3.4, T= 153.25
 Table 2
Unit Root Tests on First Differences of Nominal Interest Rates, 
Inflation and Real Interest Rates
Country Variable ADF Lag PP
Canada nominal -4.34*   8  -9.69*
inflation -4.08*     8 -17.75*
real -3.83*    11 -16.55*
France nominal -5.11*     6  -9.48*
inflation -7.17*     5 -14.78*
real -6.30*    6 -14.55*
Germany  nominal -3.74*    11  -9.09*
inflation -3.07 12 -15.00*
real -5.54* 12 -14.38*
Japan nominal -5.38*  2 -11.76*
inflation -4-16* 12 -22.0*
real -4.79* 12 -22.5*
U.K. nominal -4.41* 11 -10.76*
inflation -4.13* 12 -20.87*
real -3.87* 12 -21.78"
U.S. nominal -4.55* 7 -10.02*
inflation -4.20* 12 -14.84*
real -3-48* 12 -15.17*
Note: Critical value of the ADF and Phillips-Perron test at 5% level is 3.4, T= 153.26
  Table 3
Zivot and Andrews Unit Root Tests Inclusive of a Structural Break
Model A Model B Model C
Country break point lag break point lag break point lag
t value t value t value
 Canada 1980 Q2 0 1973 Q2 0 1978 Q2 0
 -7.17*  -6.89*  -7.93*
 France 1980 Q2 0 1980 Q2 0 1980 Q4 0
 -8.09*  -7.65*  -8.14*
 Germany 1979 Q2 4 l975 Q2 5 1979 Q2 9
 -6.55* -5.58*  -5.81*
 Japan l980 Q2 0 1973 Q1 0 1974 Q3 0
-10.25* -10.29* -11.34*
 U.K. 1980 Q1 4 1974 Q1 3 1980 Q2 3
 -4.67*  -2.90 -11.02*
 U.S. 1980 Q1 5 1973 Q1 5 1980 Q1 5
 -6.88*  -3.05  -7.07*
Note: Critical values of models A, B and C at the 5% level are -4.80, -4.42 and -5.09
respectively.27
Table 4. Modeling Cross Country Real Interest Rate Differentials with a Break in 1980
)rdijt = " 1  + " 2  D80 +  <1 rdijt-1 +  < 2  D80 rdijt-1 + e t
Countries "1   "2 <1 <2 R
2/SEE   "1
-<1
  ("1+ "2)
-(<1+ <2)
-  <1  -(<1+ <2)
USCA -0.299 -0.533 -0.477 -0.060 0.240 -0.626 -1.550 0.477 0.537
-1.281 -1.434 -4.884 -0.441 2.179
USFR 0.409 -0.791 -0.653 0.371 0.282 0.627 -1.353 0.653 0.282
1.254 -1.572 -7.946 2.762 3.098
USGE -0.614 0.565 -0.610 0.078 0.282 -1.007 -0.092 0.610 0.532
-2.078 1.329 -7.082 0.529 2.726
USJA -0.748 1.045 -0.598 -0.374 0.357 -1.252 0.305 0.598 0.971
-1.628 1.571 -7.183 -2.265 4.286
USUK 0.748 -2.227 -0.782 -0.275 0.442 0.956 -1.401 0.782 1.057
1.621 -3.215 -8.168 -1.745 4.347
UKCA -1.218 0.980 -0.786 -0.323 0.456 -1.550 -0.214 0.786 1.109
-2.428 1.358 -8.265 -2.051 4.633
UKFR -0.221 0.116 -0.641 -0.471 0.385 -0.344 -0.094 0.641 1.112
-0.433 0.155 -7.819 -2.633 4.884
UKGE -1.135 2.678 -0.569 -0.681 0.445 -1.995 1.235 0.569 1.250
-2.520 4.075 -6.681 -4.426 4.057
UKJA -1.451 2.942 -0.652 -0.220 0.340 -2.227 1.710 0.652 0.872
-2.650 3.534 -8.145 -1.144 4.978
FRCA -0.800 0.735 -0.650 0.054 0.313 -1.231 -0.109 0.650 0.596
-2.167 1.378 -8.170 0.304 3.436
FRGE -1.209 1.934 -0.750 0.213 0.353 -1.612 1.350 0.750 0.537
-3.275 3.423 -9.215 1.198 3.341
FRJA -0.874 2.432 -0.463 -0.405 0.270 -1.889 1.795 0.463 0.868
-1.574 2.837 -6.369 -2.178 5.165
GECA 0.257 -1.268 -0.647 -0.047 0.318 0.398 -1.456 0.647 0.694
0.816 -2.505 -7.700 -0.283 3.010
GEJA -0.114 0.686 -0.510 -0.739 0.371 -0.223 0.458 0.510 1.249
-0.246 1.004 -6.759 -4.105 4.437
CAJA -0.465 2.563 -0.705 -0.392 0.408 -0.660 1.912 0.705 1.097
-0.954 3.337 -8.244 -2.266 4.637
Note: rdijt is the difference between the real interest rates in countries i and j, and D80 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 after 1980 Q1 and is 0 otherwise;  t values are beneath the coefficients; critical values at the
5% and 1%  levels are 1.96 and 3.35, respectively.28
Table 5. Modeling Cross-Country Real Interest Differentials with a Break in 1973
)rdijt = " 1  + " 2  D73 +  <1 rdijt-1 +  < 2  D73 rdijt-1 + e t




-(<1+   <2)
-  <1  -(<1+ <2)
USCA -0.177  -0.524  -0.706  0.244  0.257  -0.252  1.521  0.706  0.461 
-0.639  -1.444  -4.983  1.521  2.154 
USFR 0.890  -1.377  -0.665  0.298  0.285  1.339  1.330  0.665  0.367 
2.202  -2.676  -7.514  2.276  3.093 
USGE 0.023  -0.502  -0.740  0.240  0.293  0.032  0.956  0.740  0.500 
0.068  -1.149  -6.365  1.656  2.704 
USJA -1.228  1.496  -0.615  -0.189  0.356  -1.997  -0.333  0.615  0.804 
-2.050  2.059  -5.545  -1.274  4.292 
USUK 0.067  -0.280  -0.948  0.152  0.404  0.071  0.268  0.948  0.796 
0.117  -0.393  -5.515  0.791  4.491 
UKCA -0.337  -0.742  -0.984  0.111  0.438  -0.342  1.236  0.984  0.873 
-0.561  -0.981  -5.851  0.587  4.708 
UKFR 0.895  -1.709  -0.739  -0.059  0.377  1.212  1.020  0.739  0.797 
1.406  -2.145  -6.596  -0.391  4.914 
UKGE -0.053  -0.388  -0.894  0.245  0.340  -0.060  0.680  0.894  0.649 
-0.095  -0.551  -5.146  1.277  4.424 
UKJA -1.553  1.914  -0.726  0.119  0.311  -2.139  -0.594  0.726  0.608 
-2.189  2.223  -5.476  0.753  5.087 
FRCA -1.136  1.027  -0.723  0.204  0.324  -1.571  0.210  0.723  0.520 
-2.517  1.844  -7.976  1.408  3.410 
FRGE -0.922  1.104  -0.717  0.202  0.315  -1.285  -0.353  0.717  0.516 
-2.051  1.980  -7.594  1.424  3.439 
FRJA -1.570  2.738  -0.466  -0.254  0.283  -3.370  -1.623  0.466  0.720 
-2.206  3.107  -5.349  -1.797  5.120 
GECA -0.238  -0.038  -0.831  0.339  0.313  -0.287  0.562  0.831  0.492 
-0.619  -0.079  -6.963  2.303  3.020 
GEJA -1.349  2.303  -0.656  -0.092  0.346  -2.055  -1.274  0.656  0.749 
-2.139  2.978  -5.540  -0.609  4.525 
CAJA -1.319  3.065  -0.740  -0.210  0.423  -1.784  -1.838  0.740  0.950 
-2.129  3.924  -6.574  -1.378  4.577 
Note: rdijt is the difference between the real interest rates in countries i and j, and D73 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 after 1973 Q1 and is 0 otherwise;  t values are beneath the coefficients; critical values at the
5% and 1%  levels are 1.96 and 3.35, respectively. 29
Table 6. Modeling U.S. Nominal Interest Differentials
)rdijt = " 1  + < 1  rdijt-1 + e t
Spread   "1 <1 R
2/SEE   "/-<1 <1
Euro dollar vs. t-bill 0.252   -0.209   0.099  1.204  0.209 
3.395*  -4.106*  0.506 
Commercial paper vs. t-bill 0.238   -0.325    0.158  0.732  0.325 
4.837*  -5.777*  0.356 
Note: All interest rates are for 3-month instruments and expressed as 360-day money market yields; t values are
beneath the coefficients; critical values at the 5% and 1% levels are 1.96 and 3.35, respectively.  An asterisk 
denotes significance at the 1%  level. 30